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II. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case 
This is an appeal from the district court's judgment dismissing Mr. Juan Anthony 
Jimenez's successive petition for post-conviction relief without an evidentiary hearing. 
B. General Course of Proceedings 
1. Underlying criminal proceedings 
In his Opening Brief in Docket Number 40109, 1 Mr. Jimenez described the underlying 
criminal proceedings at issue as follows: 
The evening of September 9, 2007, witnesses observed men arguing in a 
Caldwell Maverick store. R. Vol. 2, p. 158 (p. 147, In. 2-9); p. 171 (p. 200, In. 1-
15). Witnesses then observed Mr. Jimenez push another person, later identified as 
Jay Voshall, into a sunglass display and then leave the store with another man. Id. 
at p. 158 (p. 147, In. 16-20; 148, In. 1-9); p. 162 (p. 164, In. 18-21); p. 166 (p. 
180, In. 2-7); p. 172 (p. 201, In. 12 - p. 202, In. 9). Witnesses thought they had 
just observed a shoving match and nobody observed a knife. Id. at p. 158 (p. 148, 
In. 10-19); p.161 (p. 157, In. 19-24; p. 160, In. 23-25); p. 167 (p. 183, In. 17-18); 
p. 175 (p. 214, In. 6-15); p. 176 (p. 218, In. 1-4). However, Mr. Voshall indicated 
he had been stabbed. Id. at p. 158 (p. 148, In. 10-19); p. 166 (p. 180, In. 8-12). 
Witnesses then called 911 and reported the license plate of the vehicle in which 
Mr. Jimenez and the other man had been seen getting into. Id. at p. 159 (p. 149, 
In. 1-20). 
Police located a vehicle matching the reported description, initiated a 
traffic stop and arrested the vehicle's occupants, including Mr. Jimenez. Id. at p. 
194 (p. 289, In. IO - p. 291, In. 17). At the police station, an officer noticed red 
stains on Mr. Jimenez's shoes. Id. at p. 198 (p. 308, In. 9-17). Testing showed 
this blood was human blood but no testing was completed to discover whether the 
blood belonged to Mr. Voshall. Id. at p. 227 (p. 424, In. 3-8); p. 229-230 (p. 432, 
In. 25 - p. 433, In. 11; p. 434, In. 7-15). Moreover, police did not notice any stains 
on Mr. Jimenez's shirt, pants or hands and no weapons or visible blood were 
found inside the vehicle . Id. at p. 201 (p. 317, In. 22 - p. 318, In. 3 ); p. 203 (p. 
328, In. 16-18); p. 221 (p. 397, In. 7-12); p. 221 (p. 398, In. 20 - p. 399, In. I). 
Police found a folding knife with human blood 21.9 feet off the road a short 
1The district court took judicial notice of various portions of the record in Mr. Jimenez's 
initial post-conviction relief petition, including the appellate briefing. CR 165-66, 199. 
distance from the Maverick. Id. at p. 204 (p. 329, In. 4-9); p. 205 (p. 334, In. 3-
335, In. 17). 
Mr. Jimenez informed his trial attorney that the blood on his shoes was 
from a fight with an individual named Xavier and did not come from Mr. Voshall. 
R. p. 13-14, p. 53. Trial counsel nevertheless did not contact Xavier or consider 
DNA testing or other testing such as blood group or type to exclude Mr. Voshall 
as the source of the blood. R. p. 362, 19(b)(viii); p. 366, 19; 366, 110. Counsel 
also did not arrange for Mr. Jimenez to view the store surveillance video 
introduced into evidence at trial in a conference room and instead required him 
view that video through glass. R. p. 362, 19(b)(iii); p. 366, 112. 
At trial, Mr. Jimenez explained that he had gone inside the Maverick with 
his friend intending to get something to eat but his friend then got into a fistfight 
with Mr. Voshall. R. p. 233 (p. 446, In. 11 - p. 447, In. 2). Mr. Jimenez testified 
that he pushed Mr. Voshall but that he did not have a knife and did not stab Mr. 
Voshall. Id. at p. 448, In. 10-25. During cross- examination, the State asked Mr. 
Jimenez several specific questions about the video which he was unable to answer 
because his vision is poor. R. p. 237 (p. 461, In. 21 - p. 462, In. 1; p. 463, In. 22 -
p. 464, In. 16); p. 238 (p. 467, In. 19-22; 468, In. 4-24); p. 239 (p. 471, In. 14 - p. 
472, In. 14). 
During closing argument, the State admitted its case was one of 
circumstantial evidence because no one saw Mr. Jimenez with a knife but urged 
that a combination of the various pieces of the puzzle, including the blood on the 
shoes, demonstrated that Mr. Jimenez was guilty. R. Vol. 2 p. 283 (p. 10, In. 4 -
p. 12, In. 18); p. 284 (p. 15, In. 11 - p. 16, In. 5). The State repeatedly argued that 
the blood being on the top of Mr. Jimenez's shoes was consistent with the 
stabbing. Id. at p. 283 (p. 12, 22-25); p. 284 (p. 14, In. 25 - p. 15, In. 10; p. 15, In. 
13-24); p. 287 (p. 26, In. 1-14); p. 289 (p. 34, In. 6-10); p. 290 (p. 40, In. 10-13). 
The jury found Mr. Jimenez guilty of aggravated battery. Id. at p. 291 (p. 44, In. 
3-16). The district court sentenced Mr. Jimenez to a unified term of fifteen years 
with a minimum period of confinement of nine years. Id. at p. 343 (p. 63, In. 1-
10). 
Appellant's Brief, p. 1-3. 
2. Post-conviction proceedings 
On November 8,2010, Mr. Jimenez filed a prose petition and affidavit for 
post-conviction relief. Petition for Post-Conviction Relief. The district court granted Mr. 
Jimenez's request for counsel and counsel amended the petition for post-conviction relief. 
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order, p. 3. Mr. Jimenez raised several claims 
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including that counsel was ineffective for refusing to consider DNA testing on his shoes upon 
request; failing to adequately show the surveillance video evidence to him before trial; failing to 
prepare Mr. Jimenez for cross-examination, and failing to request a lesser-included instruction or 
verdict form for simple battery. Id. at p. 3-5. After the State answered, Mr. Jimenez filed a 
motion requesting DNA testing to compare the blood on Mr. Jimenez's shoes with the blood on 
Mr. Voshall's shirt, which was denied following hearing on September 21, 2011. Id. at p. 3. 
The district court granted the State's motion to dismiss on May 18, 2012. Id. In 
summarily dismissing Mr. Jimenez's claim that counsel should have had the blood on his shoes 
tested against that of the victim, the district court found that the "DNA testing has not been 
performed" and it was "therefore, impossible to determine what impact DNA testing would have 
had on the verdict." Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order, p. 10. With respect to 
counsel's failure to interview Xavier, the district court found that a notarized statement from 
Xavier was not in affidavit form as required by Idaho law and thus was not potential testimony in 
"the form of admissible evidence." Id. p. 17. Mr. Jimenez appealed and, on April 25, 2013, filed 
his appellant's brief arguing that the district court abused its discretion in applying the incorrect 
legal standard in denying his request for DNA testing and erred in summarily dismissing the 
petition. 
On February I, 2013, the FBI issued a report regarding DNA testing for the shoes and 
other evidence in this case, which the United States Attorney for the District ofldaho requested 
in conjunction with racketeering charges against Mr. Jimenez. CR 106-08. Mr. Jimenez's 
attorney in the federal case thereafter received those testing results in discovery, which 
established that the blood found on Mr. Jimenez's shoes did not belong to Mr. Voshall. Id. 
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On April 3, 2013, Mr. Jimenez's attorney in the federal case signed an affidavit attaching the 
DNA results. On April 4, 2013, Xavier signed an affidavit reaffirming that it was his blood on 
Mr. Jimenez's shoes and that he was never contacted by Mr. Jimenez's trial attorney. CR 103. 
On May 13, 2013, Mr. Jimenez filed the instant successive petition along with supporting 
materials and affidavits alleging ineffective assistance of counsel due to counsel's failure to 
request DNA testing on the shoes, failing to investigate Xavier Machuca as a witness and failing 
to object to the shoes' admission at trial. Relying on established interpretation of the law 
governing successive petitions at that time, Mr. Jimenez argued that he should be allowed to 
raise these claims in a successive petition because they were not raised and/or inadequately raised 
due to post-conviction counsel's ineffective assistance. CR 174. 
On January 2, 2014, the district court dismissed the successive petition finding that it was 
not filed within a reasonable time period, that Mr. Jimenez had not established a sufficient reason 
to justify the filing of the successive petition and that he failed to present issues of material fact 
entitling him to relief. On January 29, 2014, counsel on appeal from the initial post-conviction 
asked that oral argument be suspended and that the appeal from the dismissal of the successive 
petition be consolidated with the appeal from the dismissal of the initial petition for purposes of 
oral argument. The Court suspended the appeal from the initial petition and denied the request to 
consolidate the cases for argument, indicating that counsel could renew that request once the 
appeal from the dismissal of the successive petition is at issue. Thereafter, the Idaho Supreme 
Court issued its decision in Murphy v. State, 156 Idaho 389,327 P.3d 365 (2014), which held 
that ineffective assistance of post-conviction counsel can no longer be considered sufficient 
reason to justify a successive petition for post-conviction relief. 
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III. ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
1. Did the district court err in concluding that the successive petition was not filed 
within a reasonable time? 
2. Should this case be remanded so that Mr. Jimenez has the opportunity to allege that 
he has sufficient reason to file a successive petition in light of Murphy? 
3. Did the district court err in summarily dismissing Mr. Jimenez's successive 
petition for post-conviction relief? 
IV. ARGUMENT 
A. The District Court Erred in Concluding that Mr. Jimenez Did Not File His 
Successive Petition Within a Reasonable Time 
If an initial post-conviction action was timely filed and has been concluded, an inmate may 
file a subsequent application outside of the one-year limitation period if the court finds a ground 
for relief asserted which for sufficient reason was not asserted or was inadequately raised in the 
original, supplemental, or amended application. Charboneau v. State, 144 Idaho 900,904, 174 
P.3d 870, 874 (2007). Analysis of a "sufficient reason" permitting the filing of a successive 
application includes an analysis of whether the claims being made were asserted within a 
reasonable period of time. Id. at 905, 174 P.3d at 875. 
The district court found each of Mr. Jimenez's claims untimely. Specifically, the district 
court found that Mr. Jimenez had "notice" of his claim concerning the DNA evidence the date the 
district court denied the motion for testing on September 19, 2011, and thus, analyzed whether the 
successive claim was filed within a reasonable time from that date. CR 177. The district court 
found that Mr. Jimenez had notice of the problems with the Xavier affidavit no later than the 
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district court's summary dismissal of his petition on May 18, 2012 and that he did not explain 
why it took him "11 months and 26 days" to raise the claim in a successive petition. Id With 
respect to the claim that trial counsel should have objected to the shoes' admission, the district 
court found that Mr. Jimenez was aware of the claim on December 15, 2009 and did not explain 
the reason it took three years to raise the claim. Id. 
Initially, Mr. Jimenez's successive petition cannot be considered untimely because the 
appeal from his initial petition is still pending. Even if petitioners are required to bring successive 
claims while an initial action remains pending, the district court erred in concluding that Mr. 
Jimenez did not present his claims in a timely manner. 
1. The "reasonable time" to bring a successive petition does not begin until the 
underlying proceedings are concluded 
The time to collaterally attack a prior proceeding generally begins to run when that prior 
action becomes final. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(l)(A) (time period for state prisoners to file 
petition for federal habeas corpus relief begins to run on "the date on which the judgment became 
final by the conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review"); 
LC. § 19-4902 (post-conviction relief proceeding may be initiated at any time within one year 
"from the expiration of the time for appeal or from the determination of an appeal or from the 
determination of a proceeding following an appeal, whichever is later). While there does not 
appear to be a preclusion to initiating a successive action while the initial petition remains 
pending, there are several reasons that petitioners should not be required to do so. 
First, such a rule would lead to unnecessary litigation should the petitioner secure relief 
on appeal, there would possibly be no reason to file a successive petition at all. Second, as 
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illustrated by the district court's reasoning with respect to Mr. Jimenez's DNA claim, requiring 
concurrent litigation on related issues could lead to confusion and inconsistent results. In 
rejecting Mr. Jimenez's claim that post-conviction counsel did not adequately present his request 
for DNA testing, the district court adopted Mr. Jimenez's argument in Docket Number 40109 that 
post-conviction counsel "'correctly argued that the general right to a public defender provided the 
district court with authority to order the DNA testing."' CR 179, citing Appellant's Brief, p. 4. 
That is all well and good so long as this Court agrees with that argument (which counsel reiterates 
that it should). However, should this Court instead determine that the district court did not err in 
denying the motion for DNA testing because post-conviction counsel did not specifically frame 
the request as one for discovery under LC.§ 19-4904, Mr. Jimenez would be left with 
inconsistent rulings that would work an injustice. 
Finally, the district court's timeliness analysis results in surprise and is unjust. As noted, 
time limits generally begin to run after the prior action becomes final and thus it is generally 
understood that the time to file a successive petition would not begin until proceedings with 
respect to the prior proceedings were final. Without any statutory or judicial guidance, successive 
petitioners are left with no guidelines to know when they are required bring a successive action. 
The district court applied the rule "that timeliness is measured from the date an applicant receives 
notice of new evidence not from the date a petitioner assembles a complete cache of evidence." 
Charboneau, 144 Idaho at 905, 174 P.3d at 875. However, Charboneau involved new evidence 
discovered after prior proceedings became final and application of that rule to claims other than 
newly discovered evidence without regard to whether the prior action is pending is unjust and 
unsound. 
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While the reasonableness of the time frame to bring a successive action is determined on a 
case by case basis and reasonableness necessarily includes an analysis of when the petitioner 
received notice, petitioners cannot be required to file a successive petition while proceedings on 
the prior action remain pending. Because Mr. Jimenez's appeal from the denial of the initial 
petition remains pending, his successive petition was necessarily timely. 
2. Mr. Jimenez filed his successive petition within a reasonable time 
The district court listed the documents Mr. Jimenez filed in support of his initial and 
successive petitions and concluded Mr. Jimenez "possessed adequate information to file the 
successive sooner than May 14, 2013." CR 175-177. However, that Mr. Jimenez presented and 
supported his claims is not relevant to the reasonable period of time it necessarily took to prepare, 
copy and mail those documents. 
Mr. Jimenez is an indigent inmate. Idaho courts have recognized that "an indigent 
defendant who is incarcerated in the penitentiary would almost certainly be unable to conduct an 
investigation into facts not already contained in the court record." Melton v. State, 148 Idaho 339, 
342,223 P.3d 281,284 (2009), citing Swader v. State, 143 Idaho 651, 654-55, 152 P.3d 12, 
15-16 (2007). Nevertheless, petitioners are obligated to include affidavits, records or other 
evidence with the post-conviction petition or explain why such supporting evidence is not 
included. LC. § 19-4903; Charboneau, 144 Idaho at 903, 174 P.3d at 873. 
Mr. Jimenez filed his initial post-conviction petition on November 8, 2010 almost two 
years after he was sentenced in September 2008 and would have had "notice" of the claims 
contained therein. Thus, the fact that Mr. Jimenez was able to timely file and support his initial 
petition within two years of his sentencing fails to support the district court's conclusion that he 
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could have filed his successive petition in less than eleven months and twenty-six days. 
Instead, the record establishes that Mr. Jimenez filed his successive petition within a 
reasonable time. In providing a year to initiate initial post-conviction proceedings, the legislature 
was likely cognizant of the barriers facing prose inmates. Cf§ 19-2719 & ICR 44.2(1) (only 
providing for 42 days to seek post-conviction relief in death penalty cases but also requiring 
immediate appointment of counsel following the imposition of the death penalty for the purpose 
of seeking any post-conviction remedy). Analysis of the circumstances of this case establishes 
that a year from the dismissal of the initial post-conviction was a reasonable amount of time to file 
a successive petition. 
While the district court concluded that Mr. Jimenez had "notice" of the basis of his claim 
concerning DNA on the date the district court denied the motion, the written order provides 
minimal information regarding the basis for the denial. See CR ( 40109) 395-97. Mr. Jimenez 
would not have known the precise reasoning of the district court until he received a copy of the 
transcript from that proceedings during the initial post-conviction appeal. 
The record reveals that the lab report, which Mr. Jimenez attached to his petition was not 
even issued until February 1, 2013. CR 106-08. Mr. Jimenez did not obtain supporting affidavits 
from his attorney in the federal case and Xavier until April 2013. CR 103, 106-108. In addition 
to the difficulty obtaining evidence from outside the prison walls, inmates face barriers in 
accessing their legal materials, obtaining funds for copies, obtaining access to the resource center 
to make copies and funds for mailing. According the pre-sentence report, which is included in the 
record on appeal, Mr. Jimenez received special education for reading and spelling and is 
obviously untrained in the law. It necessarily takes such an inmate a substantial period of time 
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just to research and draft the multiple pages of hand-written documents that were submitted in 
support of the petition. 
Mr. Jimenez filed his successive petition less than one year following the district court's 
summary dismissal, which the circumstances establish was a reasonable amount of time. The 
district court thus erred in concluding that the successive petition was untimely 
B. The Case Should be Remanded so That Mr. Jimenez Has the Opportunity to Amend 
His Petition in Light of Murphy 
In his pro se successive petition for post-conviction relief, Mr. Jimenez alleged he should 
be allowed to present the claims in a successive petition because he "did not intelligently waive 
those issues and they were inadequately presented due to ineffective assistance of counsel." CR 5. 
Relying on the established precedent set forth in Palmer v. Dermitt, 102 Idaho 591,635 P.2d 955 
(1981) and its progeny, counsel appointed to represent Mr. Jimenez amended the successive 
petition and alleged that the claims could proceed because they were inadequately presented ( or 
not presented) due to post-conviction counsel's performance. The district court applied Palmer in 
finding there was insufficient reason to justify a successive petition. After the successive 
proceedings were concluded, the Idaho Supreme Court overruled Palmer and changed the entire 
playing field with its decision in Murphy. 
Nevertheless, some claims must constitute sufficient reason to file a successive petition for 
post-conviction relieflest the legislature's use of that language in LC. § 19-4908 be rendered 
meaningless. Lopez v. State, No. 40751, 2014 WL 5347372, at *3 (Idaho Ct. App., Oct. 22, 
2014). Post-Murphy, newly discovered evidence among other things may still provide sufficient 
reason for filing a successive petition. Id. Because the circumstances of this case give rise to 
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potential justifications for filing a successive petition other than post-conviction counsel's 
performance, Mr. Jimenez should have the opportunity to amend his petition and support any 
alternative basis. In Davis v. Professional Business Servs., 109 Idaho 810, 818, 712 P.2d 511, 
519 (1985), the Court adopted the majority rule regarding the effect of a change in law by judicial 
decision upon the disposition of a case then pending on appeal. Specifically, the Court held that 
appellate courts should generally decide and dispose of the case in accordance with the law 
existing at the time of its own decision but where the trial court was bound by case law 
subsequently overruled, the appellate court should remand to allow the lower court to reconsider 
its decision in light of the new law. Id.; see also Shabinaw v. Brown, 125 Idaho 705, 708, 874 
P .2d 516, 519 (1994) (remanding to allow the trial court to reconsider its decision in light of the 
new law because at the time it issued its memorandum decision and order, the trial court was 
bound by case law that had since been overruled). 
As set forth in Mr. Jimenez's briefing in Docket Number 40109, the district court abused 
its discretion by applying the incorrect legal standard in denying Mr. Jimenez's request for DNA 
testing. In response, the state claimed that the issue is moot in light of the testing obtained in 
federal proceedings against Mr. Jimenez. In reply, Mr. Jimenez questioned whether the district 
court's error would constitute a "sufficient reason" to litigate the claim once the testing had been 
received. Reply Brief p. 11. To the extent the Court does not remand in Docket Number 40109, 
Mr. Jimenez should be allowed to argue that the availability of the results from the DNA testing 
establishes a sufficient reason to bring a successive petition. 
Similarly, Mr. Jimenez should be allowed to present facts to support his claim in his pro se 
successive petition that he did not waive the claims raised therein during the initial proceedings. 
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While the absence of any waiver may have a factual nexus with any ineffective assistance by post-
conviction counsel, the inquiry would necessarily focus on what Mr. Jimenez knew rather than 
counsel's performance. 
Mr. Jimenez reasonably relied on the law as it existed at the time in supporting his 
successive petition. Now that the law has changed while the case was pending, justice dictates 
that he be allowed to amend his claims to conform with the new legal standard. 
C. The District Court Erred in Summarily Dismissing Mr. Jimenez's Post-Conviction 
Relief Petition Because He Presented Issues of Material Fact Entitling Him to an 
Evidentiary Hearing 
1. Pertinent legal standards 
An application for post-conviction relief initiates a proceeding which is civil in nature. 
Sparks v. State, 140 Idaho 292,295, 92 P.3d 542,545 (Ct. App. 2004). Summary dismissal of a 
post-conviction action, either upon motion of the court or the state, is permissible only when the 
applicant's evidence has raised no genuine issue of material fact that, ifresolved in the applicant's 
favor, would entitle him to the requested relief. Goodwin v. State, 138 Idaho 269,272, 61 P. 3d 
626, 629 (Ct. App. 2002). If such a factual issue is presented, an evidentiary hearing must be 
conducted. Sparks, 140 Idaho at 295, 92 P.3d at 545. 
On review of a dismissal of a post-conviction relief action without an evidentiary hearing, 
the appellate court determines whether a genuine issue of fact exists based on the pleadings, 
depositions and admissions together with any affidavits on file. State v. LePage, 138 Idaho 803, 
807, 69 P.3d 1064, 1068 (Ct. App. 2003). Moreover, the appellate court liberally construes the 
facts and reasonable inferences in favor of the non-moving party. Goodwin, 138 Idaho at 272, 61 
P.3d at 629; Ricca v. State, 124 Idaho 894, 896, 865 P.2d 985, 987 (Ct. App. 1993). 
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The right of a criminal defendant to counsel during trial is guaranteed by the Sixth 
Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 13 of the Idaho Constitution. 
See Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, (1963); Milburn v. State, 130 Idaho 649,652, 946 P.2d 
71, 74 (Ct. App. 1997). A claim of ineffective assistance of counsel may properly be brought 
under the post-conviction procedure act. Martinez v. State, 143 Idaho 789, 795, 152 P.3d 1237, 
1243 (Ct. App. 2007); Murray v. State, 121 Idaho 918, 924-25, 828 P.2d 1323, 1329-30 (Ct. App. 
1992). A defendant claiming ineffective assistance of counsel will prevail if he shows that (1) 
counsel's performance was deficient and, that (2) counsel's deficient performance prejudiced the 
defendant. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). 
A defendant meets the deficiency prong when counsel's performance falls below an 
objective standard of reasonableness. Mitchell v. State, 132 Idaho 274,277, 971 P.2d 727, 730 
(1998); Aragon v. State, 114 Idaho 758, 760, 760 P.2d 1174, 1176 (1988). As a general matter, 
this Court will not attempt to second-guess counsel's strategic and tactical choices. State v. 
Elison, 135 Idaho 546, 551, 21 P.3d 483,488 (2001). Nonetheless, this rule does not apply to 
counsel's decisions that are the result of inadequate preparation, ignorance of the relevant law, or 
other shortcomings capable of objective evaluation. Id. The prejudice prong is met when the 
defendant shows that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, the result of 
the proceedings would have been different. Aragon, 114 Idaho at 761, 760 P.2d at 1177; Mitchell, 
132 Idaho at 277,971 P.2d at 730. 
2. Why relief should be granted 
Mr. Jimenez informed trial counsel that the blood on his shoes came from a fight with 
Xavier and not Mr. Voshall. Counsel nevertheless failed to interview Xavier, seek to have the 
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blood tested or seek to exclude the shoes. As Mr. Jimenez explained to the district court, his 
claim that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to interview Xavier, failing to have the blood on 
the shoes tested for DNA and in failing to seek to suppress the shoes were each interrelated. Tr. p. 
29, ln. 21 - p. 30, ln. 13. Specifically, had counsel interviewed Xavier as requested by Mr. 
Jimenez, than the information obtained during that interview would have further supported the 
decision to test the blood on the shoes, which would have supported excluding the shoes from 
evidence entirely. Id. Without the ability to argue that the blood on Mr. Jimenez's shoes came 
from Mr. Voshall, there is a reasonable probability that the result of the trial would have been 
different. Accordingly, Mr. Jimenez is entitled to an evidentiary hearing on his claims of 
ineffective assistance of counsel. 
In Xavier's affidavit, he alleged he and Mr. Jimenez fought on September 9, 2007, and 
that "the blood on his shoes is mine." CR 103. In granting the state's motion for summary 
dismissal, the district court concluded that Xavier's affidavit provided insufficient foundation to 
support the conclusion that Xavier was the source of the blood on the shoes. However, Xavier's 
affidavit can be fairly read as alleging that he bled onto Mr. Jimenez's shoes during the fight. 
While Xavier could not conclusively opine as to the source of the blood, the fact that he bled onto 
Mr. Jimenez's shoes during a fight increases the probability that Xavier was the source of the 
blood and was thus relevant. 
Regardless of whether Xavier could testify that he was the source of blood, the affidavit 
supports that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to interview Xavier. In denying Mr. 
Jimenez's initial post-conviction, the district court accepted as true his allegation that Mr. Jimenez 
told trial counsel that the blood on his shoes came from a fight with Xavier, which had occurred 
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earlier on the day of the crime charged. Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order, p. 16. 
Xavier's affidavit confirms that trial counsel did not interview him in this respect. While failure 
to request DNA testing following an adequate investigation could be presumed sound trial 
strategy, here, trial counsel did not make any effort to investigate the source of the blood. 
The district court further found that Mr. Jimenez was not prejudiced by trial counsel's 
failure to interview Xavier or to test the blood because the FBI lab report reveals that Mr. 
Voshall's blood was found on Mr. Jimenez's pants and the knife found near the crime scene. 
However, Mr. Jimenez asked trial counsel to test the blood on his shoes, not his pants or the knife. 
Thus, there would have been absolutely no reason for trial counsel to seek to have items other 
than the shoes tested. While it might have occurred to the state to seek DNA testing on the knife, 
it is evident from the trial that the state was unaware there was blood on Mr. Jimenez's pants. 
E.g. Appellant's Brief ( 40109) p. 1, ( citing trial testimony where police did not notice any stains 
on Mr. Jimenez's shirt, pants or hands); Appellant's Brief (40109) p. 12 (citing jury trial transcript 
with prosecutor's closing argument explaining why there was no blood on Mr. Jimenez's pants). 
Further, the knife was found near the crime scene, not on Mr. Jimenez's person. While the testing 
results regarding the pants might prove problematic for Mr. Jimenez on any re-trial, those results 
have no bearing on whether the outcome of the trial would have been different had trial counsel 
established that the blood on the shoes was not Mr. Vo shall' s. 
Finally, as argued in Mr. Jimenez's Opening Brief in Docket Number 40109: 
In closing argument, the State admitted it did not have direct evidence that Mr. 
Jimenez stabbed Mr. Voshall and instead urged that the other evidence combined 
suggested Mr. Jimenez was guilty. R. Vol. 2 p. 283 (p. 10, In. 4 - p. 12, In. 18). In 
addition to the push and the knife found along side the road with blood, the State 
argued "Blood on Juan's shoes; not the bottom of the shoes, the tops of his shoes. 
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There was testimony from the officers didn't observe any blood coming from Juan 
when he was arrested. That just adds to it." Id. (p. 12, 22-25). Later, the 
prosecutor argued that it made sense that Mr. Voshall would have bled on Mr. 
Jimenez's shoes instead of his shirt. Id. at p. 284 (p. 14, In. 25 - p. 15, In. 10). The 
prosecutor told the jury that when Mr. Voshall: 
bends over, being stabbed through two shirts, I would argue the only place 
for blood to exit immediately would be in a downward direction. And the 
blood is on top of Juan's shoes, not on the bottoms, not on the treads. It's 
on the top. 
Why wasn't there any blood on his pants. I would argue the same reasons for that. 
Why wasn't there any blood in the car when the officer searched the car? The 
blood was on top of Juan's shoes. It wasn't on the bottom of his shoes. 
Id. (p. 15, In. 13-24). The prosecutor asked the jury to "carefully review all 
of the evidence ... look at the shoes, look at the knife, look at the photos, 
watch the video, study it." Id. at p. 285 (p. 17, In. 17-25). 
In Mr. Jimenez's closing argument, defense counsel argued the blood on 
Mr. Jimenez's shoes could have come from someone other than Mr. Voshall or 
could have come from Mr. Voshall's bloody nose. Id. at p. 287 (p. 26, In. 1-14). 
The State rebutted, arguing "how the heck did [the blood] get on Juan's shoes?" 
Id. at p. 289 (p. 34, In. 6-10). Before closing, the State held the shoes in front of 
the jury, indicating "the very shoes that [the criminologist] tested. When you look 
at these, look for the stains. You'll notice they're towards the end of the shoes." 
Id. at p. 290 (p. 40, In. 10-13). 
The State not only introduced the shoes into evidence, it repeatedly relied 
on the blood to support Mr. Jimenez's guilt in closing argument. Accordingly, 
DNA testing of those shoes againt the blood on Mr. Vo shall' s shirt was necessary 
to protect his substantial right to effective assistance of counsel and the district 
court erred in denying Mr. Jimenez's motion. 
Appellant's Brief, p. 12-13; see also CR 95-96. 
Had trial counsel interviewed Xavier and sought to have the blood on Mr. Jimenez's shoes 
tested, the state would not have been allowed to introduce them into evidence and argue that they 
were relevant to Mr. Jimenez's guilt. Absent the shoes, there is a reasonable probability the trial 
16 
would have been different. Accordingly, the district court erred in summarily dismissing Mr. 
Jimenez's successive petition. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Mr. Jimenez respectfully asks this Court to reverse the district court's judgment dismissing 
his successive post-conviction claims and to remand this case for further proceedings. 
Respectfully submitted this 1!1..day ofNovember, 2014. 
AMIN, McKAY & BARTLETT LLP 
obyn Fyffe 
Attorney for Juan Anthony Jimenez 
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